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Drawing on survey data on emigration intentions in Latvia, this paper studies emigration 
intentions of minorities. The paper shows, that after controlling for other factors, the probability 
of emigration of a Russian minority individual is higher than that of a majority individual. For 
Russian speakers, higher education and income levels are associated with higher probability of 
emigration.  These findings can be explained by linguistic discrimination on the labour market 
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The 2004 Eastern enlargement of the European Union has resulted in considerable labour migration from 
the “new” to the “old” member States. The possibility to work freely within the EU has certainly benefited 
the most disadvantaged individuals of the “new” member States or those people who for any reason feel 
discriminated in their home country.  
 
In this paper, I compare emigration intentions of ethnic minority and majority individuals in Latvia. With a 
GDP per capita among the lowest in the EU, emigration potential in Latvia remains high. However, 
emigration from the country could also be fuelled by discriminatory policies vis-à-vis the Russian-speaking 
minority. Drawing on emigration intentions data, I provide empirical evidence that Russian speakers are 
indeed more likely to emigrate than ethnic Latvians.  
 
The discriminatory regime, that Russian speakers would be willing to “exit”, is based on three pillars 
(Hughes (2005)). First, the Russian language, which is native to almost 40% of Latvia’s population, is not 
officially recognised in the country. Second, half of the ethnic minorities - or around 20% of the total 
population - have a special status of “non-citizen” of Latvia, which excludes them from participation in the 
country’s political processes. Third, Russian speakers’ access to public sector jobs is impeded by the 
requirement to formally certify the knowledge of the State language. In addition, non-citizens are not 
allowed to work in certain public and private sector occupations. Among the effects of these policies are 
Russian speakers’ under-representation in relatively easier and more protected public sector jobs, higher 
probability of getting unemployed and lower wage premium to higher education. All these factors would 
contribute to higher migration propensity of minorities. In addition, I argue that potentially inefficient 
minority education reform could be another emigration driver for Latvia’s Russian speakers.  
 
The empirical analysis of the paper is based on an emigration intentions survey carried out in Latvia in 
2005. The sample consists of 1060 face-to-face interviews and closely replicates ethnic, citizenship, 
gender and territorial distributions of the population. The correlates of the emigration decision are 
estimated using the ordered probit approach.  
 
Empirical results confirm that, after controlling for individual characteristics and district specific factors, 
Russian speakers are more likely to emigrate compared to Latvian speakers. Another interesting finding is 
that Latvian speakers’ willingness to go working abroad diminishes with income, while for potential 
Russian speaking emigrants higher emigration probability is associated with higher income and education. 
A positive skill selection of minority emigrants is not surprising, since these are the Russian speakers with 
higher skill levels who are more likely to be dissatisfied with the “regime”.  For instance, not only 
proficiency in the State language but also higher education is necessary to access certain public sector 
jobs.  
 
These results are likely to carry over to many Central and Eastern European countries where, historically, 
the populations have been quite heterogeneous, comprising people with different ethnic, linguistic or 
religious origins.  
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
Following the 2004 EU enlargement, several “old” EU States (the UK, Ireland and Sweden) 
decided to open their labour markets to the “new” European States. This has resulted in 
considerable relocation of labour, especially to the UK and Ireland, and contributed to improve 
the well-being of the most economically disadvantaged citizens of the “new” EU states.   
Arguably, the possibility to work in other EU countries has also benefited those “new” 
Europeans who, for any reason, feel discriminated in their home countries.  
This paper explores possible linkages between linguistic discrimination, minority 
integration policies and emigration intentions of ethnic minority individuals drawing on the 
recent Latvian experience which is interesting for several reasons. First, Latvia is one of the 
poorest EU States where emigration pressure rein large part first, second and third generation 
Russian-speaking immigrants who arrived in Latvia from the other parts of the Soviet Union 
between 1945 and 1991. These minorities are arguably exposed to several kinds of 
discrimination which may represent additional incentives for their emigration, especially in the 
context of higher labour mobility in the enlarged EU (Hughes, 2005).  
   Latvia also presents several advantages for studying emigration intentions of ethnically 
different individuals for Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) which have recently 
joined the EU or expect to become a member in the future. First, Latvian ethnic minorities are 
not concentrated in a particular geographical area, helping mitigate the endogeneity problem 
that would arise if  the ethnic minority population was historically concentrated in specific 
economically disadvantaged region(s) and therefore would be more likely to emigrate. Second, 
the respondents in the Latvian and Russian ethno-linguistic groups have similar distributions of 
income and education. Third, data on emigration intentions from source  countries have 
advantages with respect to host country data. Data on immigrants’ characteristics from host 
countries may be problematic since country-specific factors such as migration policy, 
migration networks, historical links, geographical proximity, etc. are likely to bias immigration 
to these countries (see e.g. Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004)).  
The main findings of this study, based on 2005 data on emigration intentions of 
Latvians, suggest that, after controlling for other factors, such as age, income, education and 
regional effects, Russian speakers are more likely to emigrate. The paper also gives evidence 
  1that, for the ethnic minority, higher income and education levels are associated with a higher 
emigration probability.  
These results are likely to carry over to most CEECs where, historically, the 
populations have been quite heterogeneous, comprising people with different ethnic, linguistic 
or religious origins. In the enlarged EU, 6M out of 75M or 8 % of the “new” Europeans speak 
a minority language in their country (Predan (2004)), the number being as high as 35% and 
41% in Estonia and Latvia. While the relationship between majority and minority and the ways 
in which minorities may be discriminated are not likely to be different from one country to 
another, ethnic conflicts persist. Moreover, as mentioned in the conclusion these findings lead 
one to ponder about the possibility of a potential conflict between European minority 
protection policy and EU migration policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly review the 
ethno-linguistic situation in Latvia, providing reasons why Russians speakers would be more 
likely to emigrate than ethnic Latvians. Data and empirical results are presented in section 3 
and concluding remarks in section 4.   
  
2. Latvia’s ethno-linguistic divide and emigration probability of ethnic 
minorities. 
  
The high share of Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia results largely from the post-war 
Soviet policies of massive migration, russification and industrialisation (see e.g. Karklins 
1994). From late 1940s till the very end of the Soviet rule, about 1.5 million immigrants were 
“reallocated” to Latvia from other parts of the Soviet Union to work in the rapidly developing 
industrial and construction sector. Half of these migrants settled there permanently. As a result, 
the proportion of ethnic Latvians decreased from about three-quarters in 1935 to a little more 
than a half by 1989 (see table 1). During the Soviet era, there were de facto two official 
languages in Latvia. However, Russian was the language of interethnic communication and 
dominated in certain economic sectors and public sphere, its learning was encouraged by the 
government, and its knowledge assured better jobs. As a result, ethnic Latvians were bilingual 
speakers of their native language and Russian, while Russian speakers were overwhelmingly 
monolingual (Schmid et al. 2004, Schmid 2007). 
  2Table 1. Evolution of ethnic composition of Latvian population, 1935 – 2007, in thousands 
and %.  
 
  1935 1959 1979 
Ethnic  Latvians  1438.6 75.5% 1298.0 62.0% 1344.0 53.7% 
Ethnic Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians  230.0 12.1% 644.8 30.8% 998.6 39.9% 
Other (ethnic Poles, Germans etc.)  236.8  12.4%  150.7  7.2%  160.2  6.4% 
        
  1989 2000 2007 
Ethnic  Latvians  1387.7 52.0% 1371.8 57.7% 1346.7 59.0% 
Ethnic Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians  1112.0  41.7% 865.4 36.4% 788.4 34.0% 
Other (ethnic Poles, Germans etc.)  166.9  6.3%  140.3  5.9%  146.3  7.0% 
 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, www.csb.gov.lv  
 
  As Latvia regained its independence in 1991, the Russian speaking population 
experienced a dramatic change in their “privileged” position. First, Latvian became the only 
State language, with Russian being recognized at no level (state, regional, municipal) despite 
the fact that Russian is a mother tongue for about 40% of the country’s population
1. Second, 
Latvian citizenship was denied to all immigrants who came to Latvia during the Soviet rule 
and their descendants born in Latvia until 1992. This produced an important share of “non-
citizens of Latvia”
 2.  Specifically, the non-citizens do not have voting rights, cannot have the 
citizenship of any other country and are not considered as EU citizens. They also cannot work 
freely within the EU. Third, the new legislation directly affected the labour market. Non-
citizens are prohibited to work in state institutions and certain private sector jobs (see Hughes 
(2005) for a complete list), and an official proof of the knowledge of the state language is 
necessary to work in any public sector job.  
                                                 
1 Russian speakers have relatively weak knowledge of Latvian. In 2004, only 17% of individuals whose native 
language is not Latvian evaluated their knowledge of Latvian at the highest level, 30 % at intermediate level, 43% 
at the lowest level, and 10% declared that they had no knowledge of Latvian (Zepa et al., 2005). 
2 In 2007, 44% of the ethnic minority population or 17% of country’s total population were “non-citizens”. 
Source: The Naturalisation Board of the Republic of Latvia, www.np.gov.lv  
  3  Whatever the reason for these discriminatory policies
3, their likely effect is a worsened 
socio-economic position for Russian speakers compared to ethnic Latvians for the following 
reasons. First, ethnic minority individuals are under-represented in several more protected and 
“easier” sectors where the proficiency in Latvian is essential: public administration, education, 
health services and financial intermediation (Pabriks (2002), Zepa et al (2005), Hazans (2005)). 
Second, using 2002 Labour Force data, Hazans (2005) shows that average net earning of ethnic 
Latvians were 10 % higher compared to other ethnic groups
4. The same data suggest that 
ethnic Latvians with higher education earned 86% more than workers with basic education, 
while a similar figure for non-Latvians was 64%. Finally, ethnic non-Latvians are more likely 
to be unemployed and are overrepresented among the long-term unemployed (Hazans (2005)).  
Minority individuals in Latvia would then seek to “exit” the regime which puts at economic 
and social disadvantage (Hughes 2005). With increased possibilities to work freely in the EU, 
the option of out-migration becomes more feasible and attractive. Therefore, one would expect 
more than proportionate outflows of Russian speakers from Latvia.  
Besides direct economic disadvantage, a controversial minority education reform might 
constitute an additional driver for emigration of ethnic minorities. Currently, all Russian-
speaking children have the possibility to go to publicly financed minority (mainly Russian) 
schools. At the same time, Russian speakers are strongly opposed to the 2004 education reform 
which stipulates more intensive use of Latvian in minority schools and is an important part of 
the country’s minority integration policy
5. Survey-based data suggest (Zepa et al., 2005) that 
37% of ethnic non-Latvians are fully opposing and 31% are rather opposing this education 
reform. Such opposition may seem contradictory, given that the ultimate objective of the 
                                                 
3 Two types of motives could explain the existence of “ethnic democracy” (Smith et al 1998, Smooha 2001, 
Hughes 2005) in Latvia. According to the “hard” view of ethnic conflict (Horowitz (1998)), ethnic discrimination 
is justified by the willingness of the majority to correct historical injustice and e.g. asymmetric bilingualism. On 
the other hand, the “soft” view of the ethnic conflict (Bardhan (1997), Horowitz (1998), Docquier and Rapoport 
(2003a, 2003b)) suggests the discriminatory policies are “instruments” of the rent-seeking government which 
maximises the well-being of the majority, by e.g. securing for them the access to public jobs. However, the two 
types of motives are not mutually exclusive and can coexist and feed off one another (Docquier and Rapoport 
(2003a)). 
4 A widening male wage gap in favour of native-speaking population has also been reported in Estonia (Leping 
and Toomet, 2007), a country which adopted very similar linguistic and citizenship legislation vis-à-vis ethnic 
minorities. 
5 The education reform aims at establishing a bilingual minority education system and stipulates that in minority 
schools 60% of the subjects should be taught in Latvian and 40% - in minority language, and the exams should be 
passed in Latvian. See Protassova (2002), Hogan-Brun (2006) and Schmid (2007) for controversies surrounding 
the reform.  
  4reform is to make Russian speakers more competitive on Latvian labour market. However, 
minority individuals could have several reasons to judge the reform inefficient. First, teachers 
in minority schools are not native Latvian speakers and may be unable to provide high-quality 
education services in Latvian. Second, classes are not mixed meaning that Russian speaking 
children have limited possibility to communicate with their Latvian-speaking counterparts. 
Third, an increased focus on the Latvian language at the expense of course content is likely to 
result in lower school performance of minority school graduates, and lower quality of 
education, in general
6.  
  It can also be argued that within the ethnic minority, it is individuals with higher skill 
levels that will be more likely to be dissatisfied and, as a result, more likely to emigrate. First, 
as already mentioned, Russian speakers, compared to their Latvian-speaking counterparts, have 
considerably lower returns to higher education. Second, only higher-educated Russian-
speaking individuals would be concerned by limited access to “language-specific” jobs, which 
require not only the proficiency of the State language, but also a certain level of skills. For 
example, one usually needs a university degree to get a job in the government.  
This said, one could easily argue that Russian speakers would be more likely to 
emigrate because they feel less “attached” to Latvia (or/and more attached to e.g Russia) 
compared to ethnic Latvians. Yet, this might not be true for several reasons. The majority of 
potential Russian (as well as Latvian) speaking migrants are relatively young, were born in 
Latvia and have never lived in any other country. 2004 survey data suggest that 82 % of ethnic 
Latvians and 74% of ethnic Russians feel “close or very close sense of belonging in Latvia” 
(Schmid 2007, Zepa et al. 2005). According to the same survey, only 3 % of ethnic Russians 
(as well as 1% of ethnic Latvians) “feel a very close sense of belonging in Russia”.  
  Having discussed possible reasons for emigration of ethnic minorities in Latvia, in the 
next section I test empirically the hypotheses that 1) Russian speakers are more likely to 
emigrate than ethnic Latvians and 2) compared to potential Latvian speaking emigrants, 
potential Russian speaking migrants have a relatively higher skill level. 
 
                                                 
6 Halyavin and Malashonok (2007) report a widening gap in average centralized Mathematics and History exam 
grades of Latvian and Russian secondary school graduates in 2005 - 2007. For example, in Riga, which hosts 
about half of Latvia’s Russian speaking population, the gap in favour of Latvian schools reached 9.4% for 
Mathematics and 20.3% for History in 2007. 
  53. Data, methodology and regression results 
3.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
I use data from a survey on emigration intentions of Latvians which was carried out by the 
Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre in December 2005 at the request of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The database contains 1060 observations (face-to-face interviews), 
corresponding to 0,1% of Latvian population aged 15-74.  The sample is highly representative, 
insofar as it closely replicates Latvia’s age, gender, ethnic, citizenship and territorial 
distributions. 
A survey question of primary interest for this study is “How high is the probability that 
you will go working abroad during the next two years?” with possible answers “very low”, 
“rather low”, “rather high” or “very high”. While emigration intentions of respondents need not 
be perfectly correlated with the actual migration move, self-reported migration propensity is 
usually used as a proxy for actual migration (see e.g. Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004)).  
Information is available both on the language (Latvian, Russian, other) that a 
respondent usually speaks with her family members at home and the respondent’s official 
ethnic origin (Latvian, Russian, other). Note that in Latvia one’s ethnic origin cannot be 
different from one’s parents, but it need not coincide with an individual’s native language. 
However, there is a high probability that ethnic Latvians are Latvian speakers and ethnic non-
Latvians are Russian-speakers. In our survey, only one respondent reported speaking a 
language other than Latvian or Russian in her family. However, 6.4% of ethnic Latvians spoke 
Russian and 11.1% of ethnic non-Latvians spoke Latvian in their families. These respondents 
are probably coming from ethnically mixed families (either children or spouses)
7.  
Table 2 summarizes the main socio-economic characteristics for the whole sample as 
well as for the Russian and Latvian speakers’ sub-samples
8. Mean self-reported emigration 
probabilities, the percentage of respondents with “very high” probability of emigration and 
preferred emigration destinations are also reported. Here and in what follows I restrict the 
sample to individuals aged 18-64.  As expected, Russian speakers are underrepresented in the  
                                                 
7 In 2006, 21.7% of ethnic Latvian men and 19.9% of ethnic Latvian women were married to ethnic non-Latvians. 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, www.csb.gov.lv  
8 Definition and summary statistics of all variables are given in the appendix. 
  6Table 2: Socio-economic characteristics and emigration intentions of respondents. 
  
Language spoken in 











Men 46.71%  44.51%  50.15%* 
Married 60.72%  58.24%  64.62%** 
Has at least one child under 18   44.43%  44.50%  44.31% 
Average monthly income per family member  (in LVL)  116.45  118.87  112.73 
Student 5.86%  5.88%  5.85% 
Unemployed 7.66%  8.63%  6.15%* 
Employed in public sector  27.07%  32.35%  18.77%*** 
Employed in private sector  46.59%  42.75%  52.62%*** 
Basic education  9.34%  10.00%  8.31% 
Secondary education  21.92%  20.78%  23.69% 
Secondary vocational education  34.37%  32.55%  37.23%* 
Higher non-completed education
9 10.78% 11.18% 10.15% 
Higher education  23.59%  25.49%  20.62%* 
Living in Riga (capital)  31.62%  22.16%  46.46%*** 
Living in city other than Riga  36.89%  35.10%  39.69%* 
Living in rural area  31.50%  42.75%  13.85%*** 
Latvian ethnic origin   60.36%  92.35%  10.15% 
Speaking Latvian in family  61.08%  -  - 
Ethnic Latvian but speaking Russian in family  3.95%  -  - 
Ethnic non-Latvian but speaking Latvian in family  4.67%  -  - 
Latvian citizenship  81.32%  96.86%  56.92% 
      
Average self-reported probability of emigration (1 – “very low”, …, 4 – “very high”)
age 18-65  1.85  1.81  1.91 
age 18-34  2.33  2.33  2.33 
age 35-54  1.72  1.61  1.89 
Share of respondents with “very high” probability  of emigration    
age 18-65  10.18%  9.41%  11.38% 
age 18-34  19.00%  18.35%  20.00% 
age 35-54  6.49%  4.70%  9.27% 
Preferred emigration destination    
United Kingdom  19.36%  17.82%  21.78% 
Ireland 16.03%  18.87%  11.55% 
Germany 7.95%  8.60%  6.93% 
USA 5.13%  4.82%  5.61% 
Russia 1.28%  0%  3.30% 
 
Note: Group mean comparison test applied to determine whether differences of means of socio-economic 
characteristics of Latvian and Russian speakers are statistically different from 0 (* - statistically different at 10%, 
** - at 5%, and *** - at 1% ) 
 
public sector and over-represented in the private sector. The unemployment rate among 
Russian speakers is slightly lower compared to ethnic Latvians because of a higher 
                                                 
9 At least three years of university studies completed.  
  7concentration of the former in the capital and urban areas where unemployment rates are 
traditionally lower. Importantly, the there is no statistical difference in reported mean income 
levels of Latvian and Russian speakers. Educational distributions of both groups are also very 
similar. Concerning emigration intentions, Russian speakers, on average, report higher 
willingness to emigrate. This difference is particularly high for older respondents (aged 35-54). 
Western European countries, in particular the UK and Ireland) are preferred emigration 
destinations for both Latvian and Russian speakers, while the potential for emigration to Russia 
of Russian speakers is relatively small. 
 
3.2. Empirical specification. 
 
Given a discrete and ordered nature of the dependent variable, the model explaining the 
probability of emigration is appropriately addressed by the ordered probit approach (e.g. 
Greene, 2003). The latent (non observable) variable  i Y
∗, which is related to the observed   
probability of emigration, is then specified as follows:                                                                                            
 
1 ii i Yl a n g u a g e X D i α βγ
∗ ′ =+ +   ε +           (1) 
 
where   is a dummy capturing the respondent’s ethno-linguistic 
background,  is a vector of control variables, D  is a vector of district dummies and 
language
i X i ε  is an 
error term. Given that some ethnic non-Latvians (ethnic Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, 
Poles, Lithuanians etc) reported speaking Latvian in their family and some ethnic Latvians 
reported speaking Russian, four ethno-linguistic dummies are included: 1) ethnic Latvians 
speaking Latvian in their family or “pure Latvian speakers” (56.4% of the sample), 2) ethnic 
non-Latvians speaking Russian or “pure Russian speakers” (35.0%), 3) ethnic Latvians 
speaking Russian or “mixed Russian speakers” (3.9%) and 4) ethnic non-Latvians speaking 
Latvian or “mixed Latvians speakers” (4.7%).  
The following control variables are included: age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
having a child, five education dummies (for basic, secondary, secondary vocational, higher 
non-completed and higher education), five income dummies (for income levels <50 LVL, 50-
  899 LVL, 100-149 LVL, >149 LVL and non-reported income
10) being unemployed, being a 
student, employed in the public sector, living in rural area, having family and friends contacts 
abroad (“networks”), having foreign work experience and having a non-citizen status (see the 
appendix for a definition of all variables).  
The “networks” dummy equals 1 if a respondent says that, if necessary, she can obtain 
information about moving abroad from her family members or close friends who are currently 
working or have (recently) worked abroad. Foreign work experience refers to the last five years 
before the interview. Both “networks” and having foreign work experience are expected to be 
positively correlated with emigration probability.  
Being a not-citizen of Latvia (18.68% of respondents) could affect individual 
probability of emigration both positively and negatively. On the one hand, non-citizens, who 
are subject to the highest level of discrimination (e.g. being deprived of voting rights),    would 
be more likely to “exit” the regime, compared to any other group. On the other hand, a non-
citizen dummy should capture additional migration costs, such as applying for foreign work 
visa, thereby diminishing the probability of emigration
11. Therefore, a priori, the net effect of 
being non-citizen on emigration probability is ambiguous.  
To control for possible district effects, such as different levels of economic 
development and ethnic diversity, I include dummies for each of the 25 districts and 7 largest 
cities where respondents live (corresponding to the official administrative division of Latvia). 
Finally, respondents who did not report their probability of emigration (55 observations or 
6.6% of the sample) are excluded from the analysis.  
 
  3.3. Results.  
Regressions are estimated for the whole sample, different age groups (18-34 and 35-54 years 
old) and separately for Latvians and Russian speakers. Ordered probit regression results are 
summarized in tables 3 (specifications [1]-[5]) with sensitivity tests reported in table 4 
(specifications [6]-[11]).  For statistically significant coefficients, I also report marginal effects 
of having “very low” and “very high” probabilities of emigration.  
                                                 
10 Excluding respondents who do not report their income would reduce the sample by one quarter. 
11 Recall that non-citizens of Latvia are not considered as citizens of the EU and cannot work freely within the EU. 
In addition, at the moment of interviews (December 2005) non-citizens of Latvia needed visas to travel within the 
EU. Visa-free regime was introduced in January 2007. It did not affect the rights to work within the EU.   
  9Table 3. Correlates of the emigration decision. 
Ordered probit  
Dependent variable – probability of emigration  (1- very low…. 4 – very high) 
[1] [2] [3]  [4]  [5] 
 
Age 18-64
  Age 18-34




Age -0.022  -0.167  0.050  0.068  -0.074** 
2.9 
a, -0.7  
b
Age




































































“Mixed  Latv. sp.”  0.126 -0.037  -0.075    0.131 
50 - 99  
LVL 
0.182 -0.074  0.627** 
-24.6 
a, 6.7  
b
0.554 0.048 














> 149  
LVL 
0.125 -0.174  0.694** 
-26.9 


























































0.251 -0.042  1.069*** 
-39.9 
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0.079 0.189  0.689* 
-26.8 





0.184 0.180  0.699* 
-26.9 










































Higher   0.290  0.066  0.800* 
-30.9 

















a, 2.0  
b




0.245 0.244  -0.000  0.227* 
-9.0


















Unemployed 0.217  0.257  0.166  0.520  0.023 






0.126 -0.153  -0.006 
Student 0.311  -0.0349    0.129  0.358 



























































District dummies  (32)  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 780  278  357  303  477 
pseudo R
2 0.1599 0.1576 0.1165  0.1721  0.1916 
Prob> Chi
2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
  10Note: Robust standard errors, 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
a  estimated marginal effect (*100) on having “very low” probability of emigration 
b estimated marginal effect (*100) on having “very high” probability of emigration 
See appendix for definitions and summary statistics of all variables. 
 
Main results  For the whole sample (spec. [1]), the coefficient of being “pure Russian 
speaker” is positive and highly significant, while the coefficients of “mixed speakers” are not 
statistically different from zero. Marginal effects suggests that compared to “pure Latvian 
speakers”, “pure Russian speakers” are about 4.5 percentage points more likely to report their 
emigration probability as “very high” and about 14.4 percentage points less likely to report 
their emigration probability as “very low”, other things equal. This gap, however, is not the 
same across different age groups. Russian language coefficient is positive and significant at 
10% for the age group 18-34 (spec [2]). However, the coefficient is significant at 1% and has 
higher value for the age group 35-54 (spec. [3]). In particular, 35-54 years old “pure Russian 
speakers” are 4.4 percentage points more likely (18.2 percentage points less likely) to say that 
their emigration probability is “very high” (“very low”), compared to “pure Latvian speakers”, 
ceteris paribus. Therefore, the first hypothesis that Russian speakers would be more willing to 
emigrate is supported by emigration intentions data.  
Next, the correlates of the emigration decision are reported separately for Russian and 
Latvian respondents (spec. [4] and [5]). The coefficients of education and income, usual 
proxies for individual skill level, are of primary interest. Controlling for other observables, 
compared to respondents with basic and secondary vocational education, Russian speakers 
with secondary, higher non-completed and higher education levels are 13-16 percentage points 
more likely to have a “very high” probability of emigration and 28-32 percentage points less 
likely to have “very low” probability of emigration. On the contrary, for Latvian speakers the 
coefficients of education dummies are statistically insignificant. As far as income dummies are 
concerned, they are positive, but insignificant, for Russian speakers. No clear relationship is 
obtained for Latvian speakers: respondents with monthly income level of 100-149 LVL and 
those not reporting their income level are more likely to emigrate (a result significant at 10%).  
Results of some sensitivity checks are reported in table 4 where the probability of 
emigration is regressed on continuous income variable, rather than on five income dummies 
(see table 4). Due to the impossibility in such a case to take into account respondents who did 
not report their income, this reduces sample size by approximately 25%. In alternative 
  11specifications, I include income (spec. [6] and [9]), income and income squared (spec. [7] and 
[10]) and only income squared (spec. [8] and [12]). The results confirm a more negative 
selection on the basis of income for Latvian speakers. In particular, both income and income 
squared coefficients are negative and significant for the ethnic majority (spec. [9] and [11]). 
For Russian speakers, the coefficient of income in spec. [6] is positive but insignificant, while 
the coefficient of income squared is positive and significant at 10% in spec. [8].  Concerning 
education, Russian speakers with higher and secondary education levels are again found to 
have a significantly higher probability of emigrating compared to their counterparts with other 
levels of education (basic, secondary vocational and higher non-completed). For Latvians 
speakers, education level does not appear to affect the probability of emigration.
12  
Note, finally, that in spec. [1]-[3] I do not include a non-citizen dummy, since virtually 
all non-citizens of Latvia are Russian speakers. Therefore, the “pure Russian speaker” 
coefficient in spec. [1]-[3] is picking up a possible negative and a possible positive effect of 
being non-citizen on emigration probability. The effect of having non-citizen status is isolated 
in the Russian speakers’ specifications [4] –[8], where the non-citizen dummy coefficient is 
positive, but statistically insignificant. This might suggest that possible positive and negative 
effects on emigration propensity of being a non-citizen cancel each other out.  
 
Additional results Other factors held constant, respondents with foreign work 
experience are on average 39 percentage points more likely (45 percentage points less likely) 
to assess their probability of emigration as “very high” (“very low”). Similarly, having family 
members and close friends working abroad is positively associated with the propensity to 
emigrate, in particular, among younger respondents. For the age group 18-34, “networks” raise 
the probability of “very high” willingness to emigrate by 11 percentage points more likely and 
                                                 
12 While income and education levels are usually used as proxies for individual skill level, the affirmation that 
higher skill level causes individuals to emigrate would be too strong since the estimated coefficients of income 
and education are likely to be biased because of unobserved individual characteristics, such as ability, which 
might affect education and income performance, one the one hand, and the probability of emigration, on the other. 
Unfortunately this cross-sectional data does not contain information on past income levels of respondents or skill 
levels of respondents’ parents or spouses which could serve as instruments. Therefore, the estimated coefficients 
of education and income should be interpreted as conditional correlations and not as indicators of a causal relation 
running from education to emigration. That is, higher education and income levels of respondents belonging to the 
Russian speaking minority group are associated with higher probability of emigration, even though the results 
arguably provide initial support for our second hypothesis that more skilled Russian speakers would be more 
likely to emigrate. 
  12diminish the probability of “very low” willingness to emigrate by 19 percentage points, other 
things equal
13.  
Table 4. Correlates  of the emigration decision. 
 
Ordered probit 
Dependent variable – probability of emigration  (1- very low…. 4 – very high) 
Russian speakers  Latvian speakers 
 
[6] [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11] 
Age 0.115* 
-9.6 










-0.032 -0.031 -0.035 
Age
2 / 100  -0.192*** 
7.7 








a, -1.8  
b
-0.006 -0.006 -0.002 
Non-citizen status  0.243  0.242  0.242       
“Mixed Russian speaker”  -0.246 -0.270  -0.244       
“Mixed Latvian  speaker”       -0.211  -0.211  -0.201 
Income / 100  0.129  -0.342    -0.135** 
5.3 




2 / 10000    0.097  0.036* 
-1.4 
a, 0.4  
b
 0.003  -0.017** 
0.7 














a, 14.1  
b
-0.240 -0.241 -0.230 
Secondary voc.  0.578  0.642  0.601  -0.269  -0.269  -0.267 














































a, 14.3  
b
-0.033 -0.032 -0.054 
Male 0.205  0.221  0.194  0.077  0.077  0.075 
Child -0.139  -0.220  -0.148 -0.049 -0.054 -0.013 
Married -0.322  -0.315  -0.309 -0.151 -0.151 -0.156 
Unemployed 0.333  0.222  0.334  -0.051  -0.056  -0.010 
Working in a public sector  -0.0487  -0.0493  -0.0483  0.074  0.074  0.069 
Student 0.335  0.177  0.308  0.527  0.527  0.536 
Rural area  -0.340  -0.445  -0.382  -0.422* 
-16.3 


























































a, 3.6  
b
District dummies (32)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 232  232  232  353  353  353 
pseudo R
2 0.1877 0.1918  0.1900  0.1866  0.1866  0.1858 
Prob> Chi
2 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
Note: Robust standard errors, 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
Respondents who did not report their income are excluded. 
a  estimated marginal effect (*100) on having “very low” probability of emigration 
b estimated marginal effect (*100) on having “very high” probability of emigration 
See appendix for definitions and summary statistics of all variables. 
                                                 
13 Note, however, that it is again difficult to establish a clear direction of causality between migration networks, 
defined here as a presence (or recent presence) of family members and close friends abroad, and emigration 
probability of those left at home. In particular, “networks” might be caused by rather than cause emigration 
decision, if households have a strategy of consecutively “sending” their members abroad. 
  13  Among other things, married individuals, especially those aged 18-34, are less likely to 
emigrate. Men on average are more likely to go working abroad than women. Interestingly, in 
the age group 18-34, working in the public sector reduces the probability of “very high” 
willingness to emigrate by 12 percentage points and raises the probability of “very low” 
willingness to emigrate by about 23 percentage points, holding other factors constant. For the 
age group 35-54, higher levels of income are positively correlated with emigration probability. 
Finally, as a further robustness check, the model was estimated with OLS and ordered 
logit. Both OLS and ordered logit results are consistent with ordered probit results reported in 
tables 3 and 4 and are available from the author upon request. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
It is reasonable to assume that minorities who feel discriminated or otherwise unsatisfied with 
their situation in the home country would seek to escape a regime putting them at any kind of 
disadvantage. Since May 2004, out-migration, one of the “exit” options, has become more 
feasible in the enlarged Europe. Using the example of Latvia, this paper provides empirical 
support for the hypothesis that, after controlling on observable characteristics, individuals 
belonging to the minority Russian speaking group are more likely to emigrate than ethnic 
Latvians.   
  Among the reasons why Russian speakers would be willing to emigrate, I emphasize 
discriminatory linguistic policy in the labour market, as well as potentially inefficient minority 
education reform. I also hypothesized that these are minority individuals with higher skill 
levels who would be more dissatisfied with their situation and, as a result, more likely to 
emigrate. This is supported by the observation that Latvian speakers with higher education earn 
more than their Russian speaking counterparts. Also, working in language-specific jobs 
requires not only State language proficiency, but also a certain level of education. Arguably, 
more educated individuals are more concerned about the quality of education of their children. 
  Based on December 2005 emigration intentions data, this paper supports these 
hypotheses. Other things equal, Russian speakers are on average 5% more likely to have very 
high probability of emigration and 14% less likely to have very low probability of emigration. I 
  14also find that Russian speakers with higher income and education levels have higher 
probability of emigration.  
  To a large extent, the example of Latvia can be generalized to other countries where the 
presence of minorities is non-negligible. A minor discrimination of any character, be it ethnic, 
linguistic, racial or religious, may lead to higher rates of emigration of minority representatives 
- and in certain cases the most skilled ones. It is all the more important in the light of 
increasing regional integration and lower migration and information costs. Nonetheless, the 
history of ethnic minorities and their relations with the majority of the population may differ 
from one country to another, thereby creating additional incentives or disincentives to 
emigration. Particularly important are the previous migration history of ethnic minority groups 
or the absence thereof, attachment to the country, relative size of the minority group, as well 
the degree of recognition of minority language at state level.  
  While the empirical results of this study show that ethnic minorities in Latvia are more 
likely to emigrate, the exact causes for this are unknown. In this paper, I have suggested that 
discriminatory linguistic and citizenship policies, putting Russian speakers at a disadvantage in 
the labour market, as well as an unpopular minority education reform, contribute to a more 
than proportional outflow of ethnic minorities, as suggested by Hughes (2005) and Docquier 
and Rapoport (2003a, 2003b). However, other factors might also be at work. For example, 
Soviet era self-migration experience or migration experience of parents and grand-parents 
could affect current migration propensity of the first and second generation Russian speaking 
immigrants. This is a possible direction for future research.  
Finally, one can ponder about the possibility of a potential conflict between European 
minority protection policy and EU migration policy.  On the one hand, the former supports 
preserving minorities’ identity and condemns ethnic assimilation. However, if minority 
languages are not recognized at the State level, this may lead to various types of ethnic 
discrimination in the labour market and induce emigration. On the other hand, EU migration 
policy vis-à-vis the “new” member states remains a restrictive one, especially for high-skilled 
migration as Germany and Austria decided not to open their labour markets to new member 
States while France liberalised its labour market only for low-skilled occupations. In such a 
situation, is there a contradiction between European minority protection policy, which induces 
migration, and EU migration policy, which restricts it? 
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  18Appendix 
 
Table A1. Definitions and summary statistics of variables included in empirical analysis, 
sample limited to respondents aged 18-64.   
 
Variable   Definition   Obs.  Mean  St.dev.  Min. Max. 
Probability of 
emigration 
1 – very low, 2 – rather low, 3 – rather high, 4 – 
very high  780 1.855 1.030  1  4 
Age Years  835  40.53  13.00  18  64 
« Pure Latvian 
speaker » 
1 – if ethnic Latvian and speaks Latvian at home, 
0 - otherwise  835 0.564 0.496  0  1 
« Pure Russian 
speaker »  
1 – if ethnic non-Latvian (Russian, Byelorussian, 
Ukrainian etc) and speaks Russian at home, 0 - 
otherwise 
835 0.350 0.477  0  1 
« Mixed Latvian 
speaker » 
1 – if ethnic non-Latvian and speaks Latvian at 
home, 0 - otherwise  835 0.047 0.211  0  1 
« Mixed Russian 
speaker » 
1 – if ethnic Latvian and speaks Russian at home, 
0 - otherwise  835 0.040 0.195  0  1 
Non-citizen  1 – if holds a status of non-citizen of Latvia, 0 – 
otherwise (citizen of Latvia)   835 0.187 0.390  0  1 
Income  Monthly income per household member, in LVL      623  116.45  105.40  0  840 
1. 1-49 LVL  835  0.125  0.330  0  1 
2. 50-99 LVL  835  0.261  0.439  0  1 
3. 100 – 149 LVL  835  0.188  0.391  0  1 
4. >150 LVL  835  0.172  0.378  0  1 
5 income 
dummies 
5. Income non-reported    835  0.254  0.435  0  1 
Basic education  1 – if basic education (9 years),  
0 – otherwise  835 0.093 0.291  0  1 
Secondary 
education 
1 – if secondary education (12 years),  
0 – otherwise  835 0.219 0.414  0  1 
Secondary 
vocational ed.  
1 – if secondary vocational education,  
0 – otherwise  835 0.344 0.475  0  1 
Higher non-
completed ed. 
1 – if higher non-completed education (at least 
three years of university studies completed), 0- 
otherwise 
835 0.108 0.310  0  1 
Higher education  1 – if higher education, 0- otherwise  835  0.236  0.425  0  1 
Child  1 – has (at least) 1 child under 18,  
0 – otherwise  835 0.444 0.497  0  1 
Male  1  - if male, 0 – female  835  0.467  0.499  0  1 
Married  1 – if married or lives with a partner,  
0 – otherwise  835 0.607 0.489  0  1 
Works in public 
sector 
1 – if works in public sector,  
0  - otherwise  835 0.271 0.445  0  1 
Student  1 – if student, 0 - otherwise  835  0.059  0.235  0  1 
Unemployed  1 – if unemployed, 0 – otherwise  835  0.077  0.266  0  1 
Worked abroad  1 – if worked abroad during last five years, 0 - 
otherwise  835 0.042 0.201  0  1 
Networks 
1 – if has relative or close friend who live or have 
recently lived abroad, 
 0 - otherwise 
835 0.657 0.475  0  1 
Rural area  1 – if lives in rural area, 0 – otherwise  835  0.315  0.465  0  1 
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